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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[M]ay the odds be ever in your favor!”1  That phrase from the cultural 
phenomenon The Hunger Games might soon come from the mouths of 
court clerks before every regulatory takings case.  Historically, the law 
surrounding regulatory takings has been muddled.2  But the Supreme 
Court confused the field further when it decided Murr v. Wisconsin on 
June 23, 2017.3  This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision and the 
potential consequences it holds for private property owners.  Ladies and 
gentlemen, welcome to the Supreme Court’s brand-new Takings Game.4  
May the factors be ever in your favor.5 
Regulatory takings claims are governed by the Fifth Amendment’s 
Taking Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”6  Murr presented the 
Court with the challenge of determining whether a regulatory taking 
occurred when the boundaries of the relevant parcel were still in dispute.7  
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate Class of 2019. Thank you to my family for supporting me through everything law 
school can throw at me.  This Note is as much a product of their belief in me as it is of my fingers 
pressing the keys.  Finally, I would like to thank the Kansas Law Review for the long hours put in to 
get this ready for publication. 
 1.   SUZANNE COLLINS, THE HUNGER GAMES 19 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
 2.   Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory Takings, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 601, 603 
(2015) (“Scholars have long derided the regulatory takings doctrine as incoherent and unpredictable. 
The prevailing view seems to be that it is premised on a hodge-podge of vague factors . . . .  The 
doctrine is also thought to rest on inherently subjective and circular norms like ‘fairness and justice’ 
and ‘reasonable expectations.’”). 
 3.   Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017); see William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995) 
(“Since that decision, the Supreme Court has been unable to define clearly what kind of regulations 
run afoul of Holmes’s vague standard.”). 
 4.   See COLLINS, supra note 1, at 147. 
 5.   See COLLINS, supra note 1, at 19. 
 6.   U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
 7.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943–44. 
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Instead of deciding the takings claim, the majority created a new test that 
succeeded only in muddying the waters.8 
In Murr, the Supreme Court believed that defining the unit of property 
subject to regulation was the critical issue.9  Traditionally, a regulatory 
takings claim centers on whether the regulation was so onerous as to 
effectively constitute a taking of a person’s property.10  The majority’s test 
blurred the meaning of private property and harmed constitutional 
property rights by replacing a reliance on traditional state law definitions 
with a vague test to determine the property at issue.  Going forward, lower 
courts should decline to extend Murr’s reach to prevent further erosion of 
private property protection. 
This Note analyzes Murr’s effects if lower courts follow the test’s 
reasoning to its logical conclusion.  Part II discusses the background of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.  It begins by looking at the Supreme 
Court’s establishment of the field, before discussing the seminal cases that 
established the field’s primary tests.  Finally, it provides an in-depth look 
at the Supreme Court’s Murr opinion. 
Part III discusses the problems that will result from applying Murr’s 
analysis.  The test’s malleability will allow states to manipulate their 
definition of property to defeat a regulatory takings claim.  The test gives 
individual judges too much power over private property.  The new test 
likely will cause an uneven application of justice based on the amount of 
property a person owns. 
Finally, Part IV discusses why the courts should limit Murr’s reach, 
concluding its test contains enormous potential danger for the protection 
of private property rights.  If courts use an incorrect process, even for a 
correct outcome, eventually that process will lead to an injustice. 
                                                          
 8.   See Ilya Somin, A Loss for Property Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin, WASH. POST (June 23, 
2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/a-loss-for-property 
-rights-in-murr-v-wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/W9ZK-H3E4] (“After the oral argument in March, I 
worried that the Court might end up issuing a muddled decision that creates needless confusion.  Sadly, 
that is exactly what the justices have done.”). 
 9.   See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (“Because our test 
for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the 
value that remains in the property, one of the most critical questions is determining how to define the 
unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.’” (quoting Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation,” 80 
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967))). 
 10.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942; Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
Regulatory takings claims are relatively new.11  For most of American 
history, the Takings Clause only protected against the government 
physically seizing private property.12  Although Congressional records of 
sessions from the Founding Era are incomplete, there are “no records of 
discussion about the meaning of the clause in either Congress or, after its 
proposal, in the states.”13  The law did not consider regulations to 
constitute takings because, traditionally, they were viewed as “an essential 
and ordinarily legitimate exercise of government power.”14 
Courts applying regulatory takings differentiate between physical and 
regulatory takings.15  Historically, courts generally understood that the 
“core” of the Takings Clause protected property owners from 
appropriation, not regulation.16  Even today, courts rarely view regulations 
as takings.17  Courts apply a “far different and more deferential test” for 
regulations affecting property than for physical possession of property.18 
Many scholars argue that American legal history provides no basis for 
regulatory takings claims, arguing only the physical seizing of property 
traditionally constituted a taking because of its “particular[] vulnerab[ility] 
to process failure.”19  But, some find a basis for regulatory takings in the 
                                                          
 11.   See Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (first regulatory taking recognized by the Supreme Court). 
 12.   Treanor, supra note 3, at 782 (“The original understanding of the Takings Clause . . . was 
clear on two points.  The clause required compensation when the federal government physically took 
private property, but not when government regulations limited the ways in which property could be 
used.”). 
 13.   Id. at 791. 
 14.   William P. Barr et al., The Gild That Is Killing the Lily: How Confusion over Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine Is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
429, 431 (2005). 
 15.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (“As this Court has recognized, the plain language of the Takings 
Clause ‘requires the payment of compensation whenever the government acquires private property for 
a public purpose,’ but it does not address in specific terms the imposition of regulatory burdens on 
private property.” (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 321 (2002))).  
 16.   Barr et al., supra note 14, at 436. 
 17.   Id. at 437. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Treanor, supra note 3, at 782; see also Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942–43 (noting that before 
Mahon, the Takings Clause was thought to apply only to “‘direct appropriation’” or “‘the functional 
equivalent of a practical ouster of the owner’s possession,’” and that the purpose of the Takings Clause 
was to prevent the government from “‘forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole’” (first quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); then quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 618 
(2001))).  
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history of English common law.20  Professor Edward Ziegler draws upon 
William Blackstone’s writings to argue for a common law basis for 
regulatory takings that preceded the ratification of the Fifth Amendment.21  
James Madison wrote “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of 
every sort . . . .  This being the end of government . . . which impartially 
secures to every man, whatever is his own.”22  By analyzing American 
constitutional history, some scholars find that private property preexists 
government, and our early courts frequently required governmental 
compensations for “indirect or regulatory destruction of property rights.”23  
Although debate still exists over the origins of regulatory takings, 
regulatory takings are now a part of American takings jurisprudence. 
B. Creation and Foundation of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence 
This section discusses the foundational regulatory takings cases 
leading up to Murr.  In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the 
Supreme Court firmly established regulatory takings in American law.24  
Since Mahon, the Supreme Court has been largely silent in the field, 
preferring to address issues in an “ad hoc” manner, as they arise.25  The 
Court did lay out a balancing test applicable to state regulations in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, discussed later in this 
section, that applies a variety of factors to determine if government 
regulations are onerous enough to reach the level of a taking.26  In Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, also discussed later in this section, 
Justice Scalia added his contribution to the field by establishing a bright-
line test that finds a taking to have occurred if a regulation renders the 
affected property valueless.27 
                                                          
 20.   Edward H. Ziegler, Partial Taking Claims, Ownership Rights in Land and Urban Planning 
Practice: The Emerging Dichotomy Between Uncompensated Regulation and Compensable Benefit 
Extraction Under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 2 
(2002).  
 21.   Id. at 2 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 
(1765)) (“This compensation principle can be found in the writings of William Blackstone, who noted: 
‘So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least 
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.’”). 
 22.   14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1983) 
(1792) (first emphasis added). 
 23.   Ziegler, supra note 20, at 3. 
 24.   260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
 25.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)). 
 26.   438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 27.   505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 
Justice Holmes’s opinion in Mahon was the first to recognize 
regulatory takings claims under the Takings Clause.  By doing so, the 
Court “ignored the precedents in which the Court had held that regulations 
did not fall within the Takings Clause.”28 
The issue in Mahon arose from the Pennsylvania Coal Company’s 
reservation in a deed transfer of the subsurface rights to mine coal.29  
Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, forbidding any mining of coal in any 
way which “cause[s] the subsidence of, among other things, any structure 
used as human habitation,” except for limited exceptions.30  Pennsylvania 
Coal sued, claiming the statute infringed upon its property rights without 
due process.31 
The Court first recognized that regulatory takings do not, and cannot, 
apply to every governmental regulation.32  But when the “regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”33  The Court’s rationale was 
simple: “When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified 
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.”34  
The Court believed regulatory takings protection was necessary to 
preserve private property, but ultimately recognized that determining 
whether a taking occurred required answering “upon whom the loss of the 
changes desired should fall.”35 
Mahon has faced criticism since its pronouncement.36  As Professor 
William Barr notes, “the Court has struggled to articulate a coherent 
standard for determining when a regulation crosses the line.”37  Some 
                                                          
 28.   Treanor, supra note 3, at 801. 
 29.   Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.  
 30.   Id. at 412–13. 
 31.   Id. at 413. 
 32.   Id. (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not 
be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”); see also Carol M. Rose, 
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 565 (1984) 
(“Holmes first stated that exercise of the police power could diminish ‘to some extent values incident 
to property’ without implicating the takings clause, because otherwise ‘[g]overnment could hardly go 
on.’”). 
 33.   Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also id. at 416 (“We are in danger of forgetting that a strong 
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”). 
 34.   Id. at 415. 
 35.   Id. at 416. 
 36.   Rose, supra note 32, at 562 (“One case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, seems to have 
generated most of the current confusion about takings.”). 
 37.   Barr et al, supra note 14, at 470; see also Treanor, supra note 3, at 782 (“Since that decision, 
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scholars criticize Mahon for creating an “ad hoc” test that allows judges 
to decide cases based on their own predilections under the guise of stare 
decisis.38  The most basic question is perhaps the strongest: “[H]ow much 
diminution in value is too much?”39  Since Mahon, the Court has attempted 
to better define regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
2. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City 
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court 
created a test for determining whether a regulation is so onerous as to 
constitute a taking.40  In Penn Central, the petitioner sought to build an 
office building above Grand Central Terminal.41  New York City passed a 
regulation limiting the changes an owner could make to a landmark.42  The 
petitioner’s application for the office-building project was denied, and 
petitioner sued, claiming the statute constituted a taking.43 
The Court held that whether a regulatory taking occurred “depends 
largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’”44  The Court 
listed several factors to determine if a taking occurred: (1) “the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations;” (2) “the character of the governmental action;” (3) whether 
“‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by 
prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land;” and (4) whether the 
regulation is to “permit or facilitate uniquely public functions.”45  
Ultimately, the Court found that, under this test, no taking occurred.46 
Penn Central occupies a central place in American regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.  Penn Central’s importance has not shielded it from 
                                                          
the Supreme Court has been unable to define clearly what kind of regulations run afoul of Holmes’s 
vague standard.”). 
 38.   Rose, supra note 32, at 566 (“[C]ourts have incanted [Holmes’s] words in . . . ‘a parody of 
stare decisis.’  Courts apply the ‘test’ but actually decide cases on the basis of undisclosed, ad hoc 
judgments . . . .  The absence of principled reasoning in these judgments suggests that the test itself is 
deeply flawed.”) (quoting BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 235 n.2 
(1977)).   
 39.   Rose, supra note 32, at 566. 
 40.   Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 41.   Id. at 115–16. 
 42.   Id. at 108–112. 
 43.   Id. at 117. 
 44.   Id. at 124 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 
U.S. 155, 168 (1958)). 
 45.   Id. at 124–25, 128 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)). 
 46.   Id. at 138. 
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criticism.  Scholars across the legal and political spectrum have criticized 
Penn Central.47  Many argue the Penn Central test left the field “highly 
muddled.”48  Other scholars criticize Penn Central for sowing uncertainty 
among local and state governments, leaving them unsure whether their 
regulations will require them to compensate landowners.49  The Court 
determined the diminution in value was “not only against the total value 
of the restricted Grand Central Terminal Building, but also against the 
value of the owner’s other properties in the vicinity,” a consideration that 
arises again in Murr.50  Additionally, the vagueness of the Court’s test led 
several courts to applying the analysis “in a rather mechanical way” and 
to finding a taking only when a regulation rendered land valueless.51  After 
Penn Central, the Court believed that evaluating a particular regulation for 
a takings claim depended on the circumstances of each case.52  
Consequently, the Supreme Court left the law with a confusing ad hoc test. 
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 
After Penn Central, the Court mostly applied the existing Penn 
Central factors, declining to expand upon the test.  The field remained 
largely unchanged for fifteen years.  Lucas carved out a narrow bright-line 
exception to Penn Central for when a regulation deprives property of all 
                                                          
 47.   See Singer, supra note 2, at 605–06 (“The factors . . . are too vague to be meaningful without 
further elaboration and too general to decide outcomes in actual cases.  They also sometimes push us 
in opposite directions. . . . It is hard for anyone to read the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings cases 
without some bafflement.”); Somin, supra note 8 (“As scholars on both right and left have pointed 
out, this rule has little if any basis in the test or original meaning of the Constitution.  It is a judicial 
invention and an ill-conceived one at that.”). 
 48.   Brief of the CATO Institute and Owners’ Counsel of America as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners at 8, Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No. 15-214), 2016 WL 1639712, at *8 
[hereinafter CATO Brief] (“Numerous deficiencies in the Penn Central analysis lead to this ‘muddle.’  
At the outset, the language the Court uses to articulate the test is notoriously vague and generally 
unhelpful to lower courts.”); see also Singer, supra note 2, at 631 (“These [Penn Central] factors are 
not elements of a claim; they represent considerations relevant to determine whether a law ‘forc[es] 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.’” (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))). 
 49.   Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Property 
in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 186 (2004). (“[C]ommentators 
have complained bitterly of the Court’s increasing muddying of the waters with new tests and new 
levels of scrutiny . . . and its complete unwillingness or inability to provide stable guidance to 
government regulators and lower courts as to how far government may go in restricting property 
rights.”). 
 50.   Rose, supra note 32, at 568. 
 51.   Ziegler, supra note 20, at 5 (“Under this view, losses resulting from regulation, short of total 
destruction of land value, are held to be merely ‘disappointed expectations.’”). 
 52.   See supra note 39 and accompanying text; Ziegler, supra note 20, at 5 (noting the Penn 
Central test is multi-factored and that a diminution of land value is insufficient by itself to be a taking). 
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economically beneficial use.53  This was the Court’s first bright-line rule 
for analyzing regulatory takings cases.54  The plaintiff in Lucas purchased 
two residential lots in South Carolina to build single-family homes.55  
South Carolina passed a statute that had the “direct effect of barring 
petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two 
parcels.”56  The statute required affected property owners to receive a 
permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council before using the land for 
a different purpose than its use at the time of the statute’s passage.57 
The Court highlighted two categories of regulation that require 
compensation “without case-specific inquiry into the public interest 
advanced,” the latter which Justice Scalia termed a “total taking.”58  A 
“total taking” occurs “where regulation denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land.”59  The Court reasoned compensation was 
required for complete economic deprivation or productive use of the land 
because these regulations “carry with them a heightened risk that private 
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise 
of mitigating serious public harm.”60  To determine whether a total taking 
occurred, the Court analyzed (1) “the degree of harm to public lands and 
resources . . . posed by the claimant’s proposed activities;” (2) “the social 
value of the claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in 
question;” and (3) “the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be 
avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government.”61 
In his Lucas concurrence, Justice Kennedy’s regulatory takings 
analysis started taking shape.  Justice Kennedy argued a court must look 
to the “owner’s reasonable, investment-backed expectations.”62  
Additionally, Justice Kennedy wrote that reasonable expectations “must 
be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition.”63  Lucas’s 
narrow bright-line test stands as the primary exception to application of 
the broader Penn Central factors test.64 
                                                          
 53.   Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19 (2002). 
 54.   See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 55.   Id. at 1006–07. 
 56.   Id. at 1007. 
 57.   Id. at 1007–08. 
 58.   Id. at 1015, 1030. 
 59.   Id. 
 60.   Id. at 1018. 
 61.   Id. at 1030–31. 
 62.   Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 63.   Id. at 1035. 
 64.   Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 n.19 (2002). 
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C. Murr v. Wisconsin 
In the 2017 term, Murr v. Wisconsin provided the Supreme Court with 
a fresh opportunity to clarify its regulatory takings analysis.65  The case 
centered around two adjacent lots on the beautiful Lower St. Croix River 
in the small town of Troy, Wisconsin.66  The Murr family (petitioners), 
two brothers and two sisters (“the Murrs”), appealed a Wisconsin State 
Court of Appeals ruling that the State of Wisconsin (respondent) did not 
effectuate a regulatory taking.67  Murr focused on a threshold matter to the 
actual takings claim: “[w]hat is the proper unit of property against which 
to assess the effect of the challenged governmental action?”68 
1. Facts 
Pursuant to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, the Wisconsin legislature 
authorized its Department of Natural Resources to promulgate regulations 
to “‘guarantee the protection of the wild, scenic and recreational qualities 
of the river.’”69  The regulation in this case forbade property owners from 
using “lots as separate building sites unless [a lot had] at least one acre of 
land suitable for development.”70  The Murrs argued that Wisconsin took 
their property “by enacting burdensome regulations that [forbade Lot E’s] 
improvement or separate sale because it [was] classified as substandard in 
size.”71  Wisconsin countered that no regulatory taking occurred because 
the Murrs owned the adjacent lot which, under the regulations, combined 
with Lot E to form one parcel.72 
Under the regulation, if a lot did not have at least one acre of land free 
of land features such as rocks, steep hills, or water, i.e., at least one acre 
of “land suitable for development,” the owner could not build on or sell it 
separately.73  The grandfather clause within the regulation contained a 
merger provision preventing “adjacent lots under common ownership [to] 
be ‘sold or developed as separate lots’ if they do not meet the size 
requirement.”74 
                                                          
 65.   Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
 66.   Id. at 1940. 
 67.   Id. at 1941. 
 68.   Id. at 1943. 
 69.   Id. at 1940 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 30.27(1) (1973)). 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   Id. at 1939. 
 72.   Id. at 1939, 1946. 
 73.   Id. at 1940. 
 74.   Id. 
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The Murrs’ parents purchased Lot F in 1960, transferred Lot F’s title 
to the family plumbing company in 1961, and purchased Lot E in 1963.75  
They built a cabin on Lot F for the family to enjoy the river, while leaving 
Lot E undeveloped.76  The Murrs, who had received title in both properties 
by the end of 1995, hoped to move the cabin on Lot F to a different location 
and attempted to sell Lot E to fund the relocation.77  The Murrs were 
unable to sell Lot E because the “unification of the lots under common 
ownership” triggered state and local rules “barring their separate sale or 
development.”78  Both lots possessed similar topography, triggering the 
Wisconsin regulation.79  “A steep bluff cut[] through the middle of each, 
with level land suitable for development above the bluff and next to the 
water below it.”80  Each lot was approximately 1.25 acres, but because of 
the steep bank and the waterline, they each had “less than one acre of land 
suitable for development” under the regulation’s definitions of “suitable 
land.”81  The lots still had less than one acre of land suitable for 
development even when combined.82 
The Murrs filed a claim in St. Croix County Circuit Court, alleging 
Wisconsin’s regulations constituted a taking of their property.83  The 
Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Wisconsin because the Murrs 
retained “several available options for the use and enjoyment of their 
property.”84  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed after determining 
the lots merged into a single lot before applying the takings analysis.85  The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding the two lots are analyzed 
as a single parcel, and as such, a taking did not occur.86 
2. The Court’s Reasoning 
The Court answered a question antecedent to Penn Central.  The Court 
created a new test to determine the “denominator” or the “parcel as a 
                                                          
 75.   Id. 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. at 1941. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Id. 
 80.   Id. at 1940. 
 81.   Id. 
 82.   Id. 
 83.   Id. at 1941. 
 84.   Id.  
 85.   Id. 
 86.   Id. at 1948–49. 
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whole.”87  Both parties asked the Court to adopt a formulistic rule to decide 
the parcel inquiry.88  Wisconsin argued the definition should be tied to 
state law, specifically its own regulations, while the Murrs wanted the 
Court to presume that “lot lines define the relevant parcel in every 
instance.”89  The Court rejected both proposals because neither satisfied 
the need to “inform reasonable expectations about property interests.”90 
Instead, the Court created a new three-part factor test to determine 
“whether reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead a 
landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel.”91  
The inquiry was “derive[d] from background customs and the whole of 
our legal tradition.”92  The Takings Clause is not a “static body of state 
property law,” and it changes as expectations change.93 
First, courts must give substantial weight “to the treatment of the land, 
in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law.”94  A 
restriction that predates the landowner’s title is one of the factors a 
landowner “would reasonably consider in forming fair expectations about 
their property.”95  “Second, courts must look to the physical characteristics 
of the landowner’s property,” including “the physical relationship of any 
distinguishable tracts, the parcel’s topography, and the surrounding human 
and ecological environment.”96  Finally, courts should “assess the value of 
the property under the challenged regulation, with special attention to the 
effect of burdened land on the value of other holdings.”97  For example, 
when regulation decreases the value of the property at issue, it may add 
value to other property by “increasing privacy, expanding recreational 
space, or preserving surrounding natural beauty.”98  This factor may weigh 
against a taking because the “landowner’s nonadjacent holdings 
                                                          
 87.   Id. at 1944–46, 1949.  The denominator, or the parcel as a whole, is the property at issue in 
a regulatory takings case used to determine if a regulation goes too far and is determined before 
determining whether a taking occurred.  Id. 
 88.   Id. at 1946. 
 89.   Id. at 1946–47. 
 90.   Id. at 1946 (“Neither proposal suffices to capture the central legal and factual principles that 
inform reasonable expectations about property interests.”). 
 91.   Id. at 1945. 
 92.   Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992)). 
 93.   Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992). 
 94.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Id. 
 97.   Id. at 1946 (noting that if the regulated value of the remaining property increases, it may 
weigh against finding the lots separated). 
 98.   Id. 
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elsewhere” may mitigate the loss of value.99 
Applying these factors, the Court held that Lots E and F should be 
evaluated as one parcel for the purposes of analyzing the takings claim.100  
The shared physical characteristics of the lots encouraged a finding of 
unification.101  Finally, under the Court’s calculations, the combined value 
of Lots E and F was greater than the total value of the lots if sold 
separately.102  After determining the lots were, in fact, a single parcel for 
the purposes of a takings inquiry, the Court quickly determined no taking 
occurred under Lucas or Penn Central because the value of the combined 
lots did not decrease substantially.103 
3. Dissents 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas each authored dissenting 
opinions.  In addition to joining the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas wrote a 
brief dissent questioning the foundation of the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.104  Justice Thomas recommended the Court take a “fresh 
look” at whether the Court can ground regulatory takings in the “original 
public meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”105 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on the majority’s reasoning, 
not its conclusion.106  The Chief Justice believed the majority diverged 
from settled precedent when it looked beyond state and local law to create 
an “elaborate test” even though the Court’s decisions have “time and 
again, declared that the Takings Clause protects private property rights as 
state law creates and defines them.”107  The Chief Justice urged the Court 
to follow its traditional analysis.108  Under the traditional analysis, the 
Murrs still may find themselves without compensation, but with a ruling 
grounded in state law.109 
                                                          
 99.   Id. 
 100.   Id. at 1948–49. 
 101.   Id. at 1948. 
 102.   Id. at 1949. 
 103.   Id. at 1949–50. 
 104.   Id. at 1957–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 105.   Id. at 1957. 
 106.   Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“This bottom-line conclusion does not trouble me; 
the majority presents a fair case . . . .”). 
 107.   Id.  
 108.   Id. at 1950, 1953 (“State laws define the boundaries of distinct units of land, and those 
boundaries should, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, determine the parcel at issue.”). 
 109.   See id. at 1950. 
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The dissent criticized the majority for allowing the regulatory takings 
analysis to leak into determining the relevant parcel.110  The majority 
“focuse[d] on the importance of the ordinance at issue and the extent to 
which the Murrs may have been especially surprised, or unduly 
harmed.”111  The Chief Justice argued “these issues should be considered 
when deciding if a regulation constitutes a ‘taking.’”112  By analyzing these 
factors to determine the relevant parcel, the Chief Justice believed the 
majority “undermine[d] the effectiveness of the Takings Clause as a check 
on the government’s power.”113 
Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts believed the majority incorrectly 
analyzed a relatively simple case.114  The Murrs acquired Lots E and F 
from their parents.115  After the lots came under common ownership, “the 
challenged ordinance prevented them from being ‘sold or developed as 
separate lots.’”116  After determining state law merged the lots, only then 
would the Chief Justice determine whether a taking occurred.117  Instead 
of determining whether a taking existed, the Justices split over the 
underlying analysis for determining the relevant parcel.118  As will be 
discussed in Part III, the majority’s test poses a potential threat to the 
protection of private property. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Since Mahon, courts have struggled to decide when a regulation 
constitutes a taking.119  Unfortunately, Murr will not ease their burden.  
“Like the ultimate question whether a regulation has gone too far, the 
question of the proper parcel120 in regulatory takings cases cannot be 
                                                          
 110.   Id. at 1954. 
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id.  
 113.   Id. 
 114.   Id. at 1956 (“Staying with a state law approach to defining ‘private property’ would make 
our job in this case fairly easy.”). 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   Id. (quoting Wis. Admin Code § NR 118.08(4)(a)(2) (2017)). 
 117.   Id. at 1957. 
 118.   Id. at 1950. 
 119.   See John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings 
Decision, 32 ELR 11235, 11235 (2002) (“A future challenge for courts and litigants will be to create 
a predictable legal standard out of the famously muddy language of the Penn Central decision.”). 
 120.   See generally id. at 11241 (“The parcel rule . . . prohibits analysis of a taking claim by 
focusing on the restricted portion of a larger parcel, or by examining restricted uses to the exclusion 
of other permitted uses.”).   
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solved by any simple test.”121  Following this statement, the majority 
delivered a complicated factors test likely to sow increased confusion in 
the regulatory takings field.  Since America’s founding, the protection of 
private property has been central to our constitutional system.122  Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged the long-held principle that strong property rights 
are necessary to keep people free.123  The security provided by private 
property makes the majority’s test even more concerning. 
The Murr test is brand-new and most courts have not yet had an 
opportunity to apply it.  However, the Court’s analysis does lead to some 
reasonable conclusions as to the trajectory of the law if courts apply 
Murr’s reasoning to all regulatory takings cases.  First, the Murr test 
creates a path for States to redefine private property to avoid a takings 
claim.124  Second, judges can assume increased power over property 
because parties will need judges to weigh the non-exhaustive list of 
factors.125  Finally, landowners with multiple contiguous plots may be 
unfairly discriminated against because Murr makes it harder to find a 
taking.126 
A. States Can Now Massage the Definition of Property Specifically to 
Defeat a Takings Claim 
The Court’s decision places state governments and agencies in control 
when determining the definition of property.  Under Murr, courts consider 
a government’s regulatory interest when determining what the “parcel as 
a whole” is before considering if a taking has occurred.  Under Penn 
Central, however, courts construed the “parcel as a whole” in accordance 
with existing definitions found in state or local law before applying the 
takings test.  Murr reduces state or local property definitions to one of 
multiple factors to consider.  Although dicta in Penn Central alludes to the 
idea that ownership of other contiguous property may lessen the harm of 
                                                          
 121.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 122.   See James Madison, Federalist No. 54, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF 
ESSAYS WRITTEN IN FAVOUR OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION 267 (Coventry House Publ’g 
ed., 2015) (1788) (“Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the person, 
of individuals.”). 
 123.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (“Property rights are necessary to preserve freedom, for property 
ownership empowers persons to shape and to plan their own destiny in a world where governments 
are always eager to do so for them.”). 
 124.   See id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 125.   See Somin, supra note 8.  
 126.   See id. (“The bigger the unit that counts as the relevant parcel, the less likely it is that the 
courts will rule that a restriction on the use of any part of it is a taking requiring compensation.”). 
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a regulation,127  Murr makes ownership of other property, even non-
contiguous property, a factor when determining the “parcel as a whole.”  
This allows governments to gain an advantage over the private party by 
changing the property at issue before the core issue, whether the regulation 
is overly burdensome, is even considered.  The malleability of the factors 
to be considered by courts provides governments the opportunity to create 
a special definition of private property to defeat a regulatory takings claim.  
Murr itself is evidence of this.  Wisconsin treated Lot E and Lot F as 
separate units when assessing state property tax,128 yet under the regulation 
at issue in the case, the state combined the lots into one, defeating the 
Murrs’ claim.  State agencies could easily create regulations that, while 
not affecting tax collection, would only affect property when a regulatory 
takings claim is made, as in Murr. 
By analyzing previous regulatory takings cases, such as Penn Central, 
it is possible a built-in government advantage was just an issue waiting to 
raise its head.  From the outset, the Court’s language for the Penn Central 
analysis was “notoriously vague and generally unhelpful to the lower 
courts.”129  The Supreme Court left lower courts attempting to define a 
legal field the Supreme Court created but for which, in many ways, it 
forgot to include the instructions.  The ad hoc factors of Penn Central 
already provided governments with an opportunity to tip the scales in their 
favor through the creation of laws and regulations.  Additionally, states 
and local governments can use preambles and statements of purpose, 
which are not actually operative parts of a law, to give the appearance of 
governmental action to promote public safety and the general welfare.  
Because these proffered purposes are considered by courts applying the 
Murr test, they increase state and local governments’ ability to regulate 
private property. 
Even before Murr, scholars criticized federal courts for moving 
towards a “totality-of-the-circumstances” test that would inevitably find 
no taking each time it was applied.130  Murr pushed the Court’s 
jurisprudence across that line.  Its factors create a totality-of-the-
circumstances test slanted in favor of state and local governments.  A 
                                                          
 127.   Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (“The restrictions 
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and . . . afford appellants 
opportunities further to enhance . . .  other properties.”). 
 128.   See Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1953 (citing Wis. Stat. § 236.28 (2016)). 
 129.   CATO Brief, supra 48, at 8. 
 130.   Barr et al., supra note 14, at 472 (“[C]ourts seem to be moving unthinkingly in the direction 
of applying the ad hoc, totality-of-the-circumstances test . . . .  This tendency is reflected in the 
suggestions of some commentators that every government action should be evaluated under the three-
factor test.  If that were the rule, the government would have a license to steal.”). 
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government’s ability under Murr to change definitions of private property, 
as it benefits the government, increases weighted importance of the 
government’s interests when analyzing the totality of the circumstances. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused heavily on the issue of 
governments taking advantage of Murr to manipulate the definitions of 
property to their advantage.  The Chief Justice warned that state and local 
governments will take advantage of Murr’s malleability if given the 
opportunity.131  The government will seek to apply the Murr test as often 
as possible because it counts the government’s interest twice: first when 
using the Murr test to determine whether the parcels are combined, and, 
second, when applying the Penn Central test to determine if the regulation 
is too burdensome.132  This double-counting weighs the government’s 
interest in two separate tests without extending the same courtesy to the 
actual property owners.  Murr allows the government to assert its interests 
in the land earlier than a property owner.  Governments, understandably, 
do not want to pay compensation if it can avoid doing so.  A government’s 
unique, coercive power provides an opportunity to change the rules before 
litigation even begins.  Passing regulations adding special redefinitions of 
private property would give the government a leg up by defining the 
disputed property in more favorable terms to the state.  The government, 
as any litigant would, will leap at the opportunity to “shape the playing 
field before the contest . . . even gets underway.”133 
Private parties also may attempt to use the test to divide property that 
might otherwise be considered one parcel to more easily receive 
compensation.  The majority believed the test was necessary because, 
under state law, it saw too many opportunities for “gamesmanship” by the 
state or landowners.134  In some states, lot lines can be informally adjusted 
“by property owners, with minimal government oversight.”135  In effect, 
private parties could use the lack of government regulation to divide their 
property into smaller lots, making the effects of the regulation greater.  The 
majority tried to solve a minor problem.  Even without regulations, the 
state can still use common law and tax law definitions of private property.  
                                                          
 131.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Whenever possible, governments in 
regulatory takings cases will ask courts to aggregate legally distinct properties into one ‘parcel,’ solely 
for the purposes of resisting a particular claim.”). 
 132.   Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 65 (2017) (“[T]he Court 
tethered the denominator factors to considerations that are already party of the Penn Central inquiry, 
inviting lower courts to double count these factors or to engage in merits inquiries at the denominator 
stage.”). 
 133.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 134.   Id. at 1953 (“The majority envisions that relying on state law will create other opportunities 
for ‘gamesmanship’ by landowners and States . . . .”). 
 135.   Id. at 1948 (majority opinion). 
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But, “informal” adjustments by a private party will carry less weight in a 
court than a state’s formal body of property law.  Private parties are more 
likely to be successful in manipulating their lots lines under Murr’s factor 
test than Chief Justice Roberts’s traditional state law analysis. 
But defining property under state law is unlikely to lead to much 
manipulation.  To alter the definition or status of private property within 
its boundaries, the government must pass a statute or regulation.  If a 
government changes the law specifically to gain control over a parcel just 
before litigation, a court will see this as an obvious attempt to manipulate.  
The Chief Justice grounds his approach in predictability.  Although a state 
always possesses the ability to change its property laws or regulations, 
property owners are reasonably on notice as to the existing laws and 
regulations before a taking occurs.  The Murr test lacks the same 
protections.  The Murr test has enough flexibility that the government can 
use different definitions to “manipulate” the test and gain a result in its 
favor.136  Murr provides the quintessential example of a government 
manipulating the factors that become, in Murr, the new test.  Wisconsin 
treated the Murrs’ lots as separate property when assessing state property 
taxes.  It was not until the Murrs applied for a permit that Wisconsin’s 
regulation was applied to treat the two lots as one.  The Murr test risks 
states passing regulations that lie dormant for years until being resurrected 
to defeat a regulatory takings claim. 
The Court’s opinion in Murr broke with a long history of Supreme 
Court precedent of defining private property by the relevant state law.137  
Although States always had the ability to change how property is defined, 
procedures protected property owners from arbitrary changes in the law.  
By removing state law from its principle place to just one factor among 
many, the Court weakened traditional Constitutional protection of private 
property.  A state law definition of private property is preferable to the 
Murr test because it limits a government’s ability to take property by 
regulation without compensating the owner.  As discussed above, the Murr 
test provides governments the ability to manipulate the factors and win 
more claims.  The Murr Court ignored Justice Holmes’s warning when 
first creating regulatory takings law: “When this seemingly absolute 
protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural 
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more 
                                                          
 136.   Somin, supra note 8 (“The [government] . . . will have incentives to try to manipulate the 
various factors listed in the majority opinion, so that they come out in their favor.”). 
 137.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our decisions have, time and again, 
declared that the Takings Clause protects private property rights as state law creates and defines 
them.”). 
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until at last private property disappears.”138 
Unlike state law, the Murr test may provide a government the 
opportunity to fluidly exploit property for its own advantage, such as 
winning a regulatory takings lawsuit, while also using the law to achieve 
a different objective in a separate area, such as increasing tax revenue.  
Relying on the state law definition of property provides a stability to 
property owners and the government alike.  While “the vague nature of the 
test . . . makes it hard to figure out exactly when that might happen,” a 
government, by human nature, is likely to take advantage of any 
opportunity it finds.139  Ilya Somin, a George Mason law professor and 
author of an amicus brief in Murr on behalf of nine States in support of the 
Murr family, believes that, at least in some respects, the government can 
now defeat claims just by pointing out the property owners own the 
adjacent lot.140  This danger under Murr leaves property owners unsure of 
the legal status of their property and gives States increased authority over 
private property. 
B. Murr’s Vague Test Will Result in More Power for Judges Over 
Private Property 
A strict elements test limits a judge to interpreting the facts and law to 
reach a predictable result.  It keeps the law consistent, and a party before 
a court reasonably knows what to expect.  When a test is vague, such as in 
Murr, there is less predictability and a judge holds more power over the 
law.141  The majority rejected the simple approaches offered by both 
parties in favor of a vague multifactor balancing test giving judges more 
power over the definition of private property than the State or the owner 
himself.142  The Court was on a path toward this destination for a long 
time.143  The confusion of the test leaves states and private property owners 
                                                          
 138.   Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 139.   Somin, supra note 8. 
 140.   Id. (“In at least some cases, [the] ruling allows the government to avoid compensating 
property owners for the taking of their land, merely because they also own the lot next door.”). 
 141.   See Miriam Seifter, Opinion Analysis: In Regulatory Takings Case, Court Announces a New 
Test, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2017, 9:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-
analysis-regulatory-takings-case-court-announces-new-test/ [https://perma.cc/CK5L-PC2K] (discus 
sing how the court adopted “a multi-factor approach that would provide the least predictability, but 
the most flexibility to determine the interests of justice in any given case.”). 
 142.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1954 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The lesson that the majority draws 
from Penn Central is that defining ‘the proper parcel in regulatory takings cases cannot be solved by 
any simple test.’  Following through on that stand against simplicity, the majority lists a complex set 
of factors . . . .” (quoting id. at 1950)). 
 143.   See Treanor, supra note 3, at 810 (“[Justice] Stevens thus criticized Pennsylvania Coal as 
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unsure of when a regulation goes too far, instead relying on how much 
importance a judge decides to give each factor on a given day. 
Perhaps the most worrisome part of Murr is the non-exhaustive nature 
of the majority’s list.  In its opinion, the majority stressed “the reasonable 
expectations at issue derive from background customs and the whole of 
our legal tradition.”144  That open-ended statement is in essence an 
uncounted, fourth factor in the majority’s analysis.  It allows courts to 
include factors as they see fit.  While it can be beneficial in some 
occasions—for instance, Florida beachfront property probably needs to be 
analyzed differently than Kansas wheat fields—it also gives judges the 
opportunity to insert their own personal beliefs about private property.  A 
judge that ardently supports environmentalism may be more likely to 
combine lots when environmental preservation is the government’s goal, 
such as in Murr.  On the other hand, a judge with family members in real 
estate may be more inclined to weigh factors supporting the division of 
parcels because he knows the importance of being able to develop and sell 
as many separate lots as possible. 
Bright-line tests, like those for which the dissent argues, provide a 
greater stability in the law and are better suited for lower courts to apply 
than factor tests, like the one used in Murr.  Per se rules are easy to apply 
and predict.145  A common criticism against per se rules is that they can 
lead to harsh results.  While that may be true, the benefits outweigh the 
costs.  Property is an important right.  Many people’s livelihoods are 
dependent on their land.  It is frequently bought and sold.  Predictability is 
important in private property ownership because of its importance.  An 
owner should not be left unsure as to what is actually owned.  In takings, 
where the consequences can be devastating to the private party, bright-line 
tests protect against the dangers of state manipulation.146  Balancing tests 
do not have origins deep in our constitutional history.147  They are based 
on the “identification, valuation, and comparison of competing 
interests.”148  Courts reach decisions by assigning values to the different 
                                                          
akin to Lochner in vesting unconstrained power in the judiciary.”). 
 144.   Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.  
 145.   Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 
IDAHO L. REV. 11, 86 (2003). 
 146.   Id. at 86. 
 147.   T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 949 
(1987) (“The great constitutional opinions of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century did 
not employ balancing as a method of constitutional argument or justification.  Marshall did not hold 
for the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland because the burden of the state’s tax outweighed the state’s 
interest in taxation.”). 
 148.   Id. at 945. 
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interests in the case at hand.149  The major problem with balancing tests is 
that the factors weighed may not be “grounded in the Constitution.”150  As 
discussed in Part II, and the preceding paragraphs, Lucas is an example of 
the benefits of applying a bright-line rule rather than a balancing test when 
determining whether there has been a regulatory taking.151  In the limited 
situations where courts implement bright-line rules in regulatory takings 
claims, they provide a clarity the balancing test of Penn Central lacks and 
the balancing test of Murr will not provide. 
The problem of the Murr test is not limited to potential unknown 
factors weighed by judges.  The factors listed by the majority are hard to 
measure empirically.152  This difficulty provides judges with another 
opportunity to influence the outcome with their own beliefs.  This is not 
to say judges will intentionally abuse the system to determine results that 
favor their preferences.  Often people have no idea their preconceived 
notions affect their judgments.153  Providing judges with a simple 
application of a well-defined test limits biases from entering into 
judgments.  The Chief Justice’s test remains subject to the vague Penn 
Central test but is a step in the right direction.  It brings more stability and 
certainty to the process than Murr.  A more open test allows biases to creep 
in and shape judgements. 
Some see Murr as necessary to give courts the most flexibility to 
address unique situations as they arise.  The Court had eighty years to 
develop a clear test to decide regulatory takings claims.  It failed to do so.  
The Court appeared unwilling to provide litigants a stable definition of a 
private property.154  However, this argument overlooks that it is not the 
                                                          
 149.   Id. 
 150.   Id. at 947. 
 151.   See supra, Part II. 
 152.   See Somin, supra note 8 (“The [factors analyzed under the Murr test are] a recipe for 
confusion, uncertainty, and constant litigation.  All of the factors in the test are complicated and 
difficult to measure.”). 
 153.   The American Bar Association is taking steps to educate lawyers and judges about implicit 
bias.  Implicit Bias Initiative, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-
force-implicit-bias/ [https://perma.cc/D8GG-EM9N] (last visited Oct. 9, 2018).  
 154.   See Rick Hills, A Half-Hearted Two Cheers for the Victory of Federalism over Property 
Rights in Murr v. Wisconsin, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 23, 2017), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawf 
sblawg/2017/06/a-half-hearted-two-cheers-for-the-victory-of-federalism-over-property-rights-in-mu 
rr-v-wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/T8AQ-LS5C] (“The problem with relying on the federal 
judiciary to define ‘property’ is that the federal courts are neither able nor willing to derive a 
comprehensive system of federal property rights from the dozen words of the Fifth Amendment ‘just 
compensation clause.’”); see also Blais, supra note 132, at 65 (“[T]he fact that this multifactored test 
is to be applied before the Lucas inquiry effectively undermines any plausible assertion that Lucas 
created a meaningful bright-line rule.”).  As Blais argues, Murr not only made regulatory takings 
claims more confusing but also undercut one of the few areas with clarity by forcing courts to consider 
Murr before it can even apply Lucas’s complete loss of value test.  Id. 
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courts’ job to define private property.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, that 
power historically belongs to the States.155  Professor Richard Hill argues 
Murr will not have a major effect of property rights.156  Professor Hill 
believes any attempt by the judiciary to increase its power over private 
property will “backfire.”157  Instead, he wants people to look to state law 
for property rights protection.158  Professor Hill disagrees with the Chief 
Justice because Professor Hill believes that even that approach encourages 
States to pass regulations hindering property owners’ ability to subdivide 
their lots.159  Instead, Professor Hill argues property owners should seek to 
pass regulations limiting governmental zoning power.160  While Professor 
Hill points out the very real risks of the Chief Justice’s test, he ignores the 
fact that States are unlikely to legislate away their own powers.  But the 
Murr test decreases the influence of state law.  State law is now just one 
of many factors for a judge to consider.  The judge may place as much or 
as little weight on state law as he deems appropriate.  The only certainty 
resulting from Murr is “that the takings analysis is now more complex.  
Courts and litigators will spend the coming years interpreting the Supreme 
Court’s new, open-textured definition of the takings denominator.”161  
That complexity will inevitably result in more power falling into the 
judge’s lap. 
C. Murr’s Test May Result in Uneven Justice for Those with Multiple 
Contiguous Lots 
The Murr test provides little in the way of guidance about how to 
handle scenarios likely to arise in regulatory takings claims.  The test 
provides little guidance for what to do if some factors cut in favor of the 
government but others in favor of the property owner.162  Additionally, 
                                                          
 155.   Historically, states, not courts, possess the power to define and decide property rights.  While 
states do possess that power, their constitutions and laws limit arbitrary application of that power.  See 
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 156.   Hills, supra note 154. 
 157.   Id. (“More vigorous efforts by the federal courts are likely to backfire either legally or 
politically, to the detriment of lasting protection of private property.”).  Although Professor Hill’s 
point is that federal courts are unlikely to wrest more power over private property, the last clause of 
his statement has dangerous implications.  The judiciary may fail in acquiring more power, but it is 
private property protection that will suffer the lasting damage. 
 158.   Id. (“So where should we look for property rights protection?  Mostly state law, I believe.”). 
 159.   Id. 
 160.   Id. 
 161.   Seifter, supra note 141. 
 162.   See Blais, supra note 132, at 65 (“These vague, subjective factors hardly bring clarity to the 
already confused denominator dilemma.”); Somin, supra note 8 (“[T]he Court provides little if any 
guidance on what to do if some of these factors cut in favor of the government, and others in support 
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Murr provides little guidance for courts in situations where a litigant owns 
more than two contiguous lots.  The majority failed to consider how its 
test may affect various kinds of properties.163  Those most likely to be 
negatively affected are wealthy property owners and farmers.  Both groups 
are more likely to own large tracts of land that, under Murr, are now at 
risk of being combined for takings claims. 
The Court’s test created a fluidity where multiple lots may be 
considered one parcel for one takings claim but separate for another.164  
This fluidity fails to promote stability.  Instead, it leaves individuals at the 
mercy of a judge’s beliefs about that regulation or piece of property.  Small 
businesses are particularly susceptible to the disadvantages of 
“aggregating contiguous parcels.”165  Small businesses often suffer a larger 
burden from regulations than others, so Murr leaves them unsure of their 
property and may discourage people from starting their own business.166  
Additionally, small business owners have less capital to risk, and often use 
multiple lots for different purposes. 
Murr places the principal that everyone should receive the same 
treatment before the law at risk.  Wealthier property owners are more 
likely to own multiple parcels of land.  This is not a new issue arising out 
of Murr.  The regulatory takings field is criticized for unfairly punishing 
the wealthy by making it harder for a taking to occur.167  By removing state 
law as the primary definer of property, Murr only increases the likelihood 
of this happening.  Murr encourages the aggregation of contiguous 
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compared, the diminution in value test emerges as a deep pocket rule, as holders of extensive property 
must suffer a greater diminution in value in order to establish a takings claim.”); Wright, supra note 
49, at 179–80 (“[S]ome commentators have criticized the parcel-as-a-whole rule because it 
‘discriminates against those who happen to have a larger group of property rights in a single place.’” 
(quoting John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1535, 1552 (1994))).  
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property.  When a person owns more lots, he must suffer a far greater 
diminution in value if the lots are combined than someone who owns only 
one lot, or even the Murrs, who owned two. 
A strict state law approach could also harm owners of substantial 
amounts of property, like farmers.  If property is defined solely by the lot 
lines drawn by a state, states may be reluctant to allow owners to subdivide 
their property because doing so will only increase Takings Clause 
protections.168  While this is a valid concern, it ignores one important fact: 
the property was one parcel when purchased.  The owner may want to 
divide his property, but if denied by the government, the owner is left in 
the same position as when it was purchased.  In contrast, when the 
government aggregates multiple lots into one parcel, the owner’s property 
is changed.  The owner goes from having multiple sellable parcels to just 
one.  Under state law, property owners may not be able to increase the 
number of separate parcels owned, but also will not see their property 
decrease.  It is important to point out again, the results from Murr are far 
from clear.  Powerful interest groups, such as realtors or farmers, may step 
in to prevent the government from passing regulations limiting subdivision 
of property.169 
IV. LOWER COURTS SHOULD DECLINE TO EXTEND MURR BEYOND ITS 
SPECIFIC ISSUES 
The majority’s opinion leaves the lower courts with a great deal of 
discretion to interpret the factors test.  The lower courts should limit the 
Murr test to the issue involved in the case.  Courts should limit the test to 
when only two contiguous lots are at issue.  This Note does not advocate 
for district court judges to engage in judicial activism and ignore Supreme 
Court precedent.  Lower courts are not permitted to ignore Supreme Court 
precedent.170  It merely recognizes the fact that lower courts are much more 
                                                          
 168.   See Hills, supra note 154 (“[S]uch a stance just invites states to slow-walk all efforts to 
subdivide parcels.  If the federally protected aspect of state law is the lot line, then one can predict that 
counties will be loath to allow farmers to spilt their farms up, multiplying lot lines and, thus federally 
protected property.”). 
 169.   See Ilya Somin, More on Murr – A Response to Rick Hills, WASH. POST (June 23, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/23/more-on-murr-a-response 
-to-rick-hills/?utm_term=.10ddf1867cbe&tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/J2FC-6JLF] (“It is far from 
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interest groups in most communities, such as politically influential developers, who depend on 
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 170.   David C. Bratz, Comment, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of 
Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 91 (1984) (“Yet lower courts are also constrained by 
their subordinate position in the judicial system.  The American judicial hierarchy deprives lower 
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heavily involved in the practical effect on citizens.171  The Supreme Court 
created a test in Murr, but it is left to the lower courts to determine how it 
applies to the daily lives of the citizens before it. 
District Courts should recognize that while Murr applies to two 
contiguous lots for the purposes of a regulatory takings claim, it does not 
answer how more than two lots, non-contiguous lots, or other property 
ownership questions should be answered.  Courts would be better off, and 
property owners would benefit, from limiting the Murr test.  Courts should 
not follow Quinn v. Board of County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s 
County,172 an example of the Fourth Circuit using Murr too expansively 
and harming the protection of private property.  Instead, the courts should 
only apply Murr when an important governmental interest is implicated, 
such as preservation of the environment, as was the case in Murr.  These 
interests must be greater than a government’s normal interest in regulation, 
otherwise the limitation would be effectively meaningless. 
An owner’s interest in her property is set by the “geographic 
dimensions” of her property.173  By expanding the test, courts will blur the 
“geographic dimensions.”  Property interests will go from being 
determined by bright lines separating one lot from another to being 
determined by the subjective determination of a judge.  The issue 
magnifies when the number of lots at issue increases.  Aggregation of 
separate lots under Murr may result in a determination of no taking, even 
though the regulation at issue may cause a substantial diminution of 
property value.  The greater the aggregation the greater the harm to 
property owners. 
The first case to address Murr in a more than superficial way was 
Quinn.174  Quinn challenged the “Grandfather/Merger” provision under 
which the county refused building permits “for [lots] smaller than the 
                                                          
courts of the right simply to refuse to follow binding Supreme Court precedent.”). 
 171.   Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
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 172.   Quinn v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 862 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 173.   See Brief for the States of Nevada et al., supra note 165, at 19 (“Importantly, the Court held 
‘[a]n interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its geographic 
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Pulte Home Corp. v. Montgomery Cty., No. GJH-14-3955, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138101 (D. Md. 
Aug. 25, 2017); Duncan v. Becerra, No. 3:17-cv-1017-BEN, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101549 (S.D. 
Cal. June 29, 2017).  
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minimum size . . . unless that lot was merged with any contiguous lots 
under common ownership.”175  Quinn owned over 200 lots of undeveloped 
land.176  Quinn needed sewer systems running through his lot to complete 
his intended housing development, but the county passed a ordinance 
prohibiting sewer system extension to streets with only vacant lots.177  The 
county also required new lots to meet a minimum size to receive building 
permits.178  Quinn’s 200 lots failed to meet the minimum required size.179  
Analyzing the Murr factors, the Fourth Circuit held no taking occurred 
because Quinn owned twelve lots that could be merged into four lots and 
developed or sold.180  The Fourth Circuit raised the similar physical 
characteristics of the land.181  Weighing physical characteristics of land in 
areas with large stretches of similar topography essentially preordains 
multiple lots being merged into one for a takings claim.  The Fourth Circuit 
found no taking because “[v]iewed as a collective, the lots are still 
developable,” overlooking the fact that each of the twelve lots held less 
value under the “Grandfather/Merger” provision because each retained 
some value as a portion of the four lots created after the merger.182 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis provides a limited, but beneficial 
example of the direction Murr is likely to take regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.  It recognized each individual lot lost value under the 
regulation, as well as the fact Quinn lost freedom to use his property as he 
saw fit.  Instead of the Fourth Circuit simply holding that Quinn lacked a 
right to sewer service, it applied parts of the Murr test to find the County 
acted properly to force Quinn to merge his lots.183  This analysis was 
largely unnecessary and likely would not have occurred but for Murr.  The 
Fourth Circuit believed Murr directed analysis over takings claims when 
the landowner owns multiple lots.  Its inclusion of Murr is evidence that 
the Murr test likely will not have a limited effect, as many claim.  Murr is 
likely to disrupt the definition of private property in every case where the 
landowner possesses multiple lots, especially if they are contiguous. 
The Murr test is vague and highly malleable.  Courts can use the 
vagueness to shape doctrine in their jurisdiction to favor or harm private 
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property ownership as they see fit.  Drawing precedential lines early forces 
the test to be as objective as possible.  It is difficult to determine how to 
quantify each factor.  Limiting application of these factors prevents the 
test from running away from the Court’s original intent, creating a test that 
takes all factors of regulations and ownership into account. 
Judicial tests evolve through judicial interpretation.  While they lack 
the authority to overturn the Supreme Court, lower court judges possess 
the power to interpret what the Supreme Court’s rulings mean.184  By 
failing to limit the test to two contiguous parcels where the government 
has a significant interest, courts leave open the opportunity for Murr to 
seep into other takings claims.  The most likely expansion occurs when an 
owner owns multiple lots that are not contiguous.  Murr alluded to the idea 
that a loss may be lessened if the owner has other property to offset the 
loss in value.  Penn Central analyzed the other property owned by the 
plaintiffs as well.  It is a small leap from the contiguous plots in Murr to 
considering any property under common ownership.  If the lots are close 
geographically, courts could decide they are aggregated for a takings 
claim.  That expansion begins to affect property owners merely for owning 
property, regardless of whether it is contiguous.  Another possibility, 
although less likely, is using this test when only a single lot is at issue.  If 
courts begin to consider the government’s interest and the owner’s 
reasonable expectations of a single lot before even analyzing the effect of 
the regulation on the property, regulatory takings protection is essentially 
dead.  Lower courts should find Murr’s place in the regulatory takings 
field before its ambiguity works to dominate the field and render the 
government the easy victor every time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is to prevent a 
government from taking its citizens’ private property without paying just 
compensation.  Until Murr, what made up the relevant parcel was a simple 
question primarily governed by state law.  Now, that question is murky 
and potentially has negative consequences for property owners bringing 
takings claims.  States may now create regulations for the purpose of 
defeating regulatory takings claims.  The confusing factors test will put 
more power into the hands of the judges, as they are now allowed to 
determine the definition of your property.  The Murr test will likely punish 
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landowners with multiple contiguous lots by making it harder to succeed 
on takings claims.  Courts should set boundaries on Murr to prevent its 
expansion.  Extending Murr risks creating even greater confusion in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence.  Now, litigants are left hoping the factors 
will be ever in their favor.  And while we will never see regulatory takings 
in the Quarter Quell185 nor a revolution to end a dangerous system, under 
Murr, private property is at greater risk than before. 
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